The Economic Community of West African states (Ecowas) is set to mark 50 years in May 2025. It was established in 1975 by 16 member states. Though seven of the founding leaders had ascended to power through coups d’état, the initial focus was economic growth and regional trade and cooperation.
Within three years, however, its mandates were expanded to encompass political, security and other objectives. These additions were necessary as the west African post-independence governments sought to respond to shifting socio-economic and security challenges. These included coup d’états in Niger, Nigeria, Ghana and Mauritania. There were also other threats to the rule of law, electoral integrity and good governance.
To address the expansion of its mandate, the Ecowas treaties were revised in 1993 to pass more power to the regional bloc.
These changes unsettled the relationships among member states. Acting in unison or following the rules hasn’t always suited national agendas. That partly explains the decision by Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso to break away from Ecowas in 2024.
Most recently, the military government in Guinea and Togo’s Gnassingbe dynasty have both resisted Ecowas pressure. Their domestic political agendas contradict the organisation’s norms and principles.
We have years of research spanning politics, citizenship, international relations and civil conflict.
Admittedly, the withdrawal of Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso – to form the Alliance of Sahel States – will form an unsettling cloud over the Ecowas anniversary. We argue however that despite inevitable upheavals during five decades of postcolonial nation-building, Ecowas can look back on successes in integration, peace and security, and good governance.
These include its emphasis on good governance; its conflict prevention framework; and member states’ responsibility to protect their populations from grave violations of human rights.
The consequences of the withdrawal of the three countries for Ecowas as a whole shouldn’t be overstated. Still, it is a telling blow to the organisation. It represents a direct questioning of the principle of regional integration and cooperation.
The three military juntas evidently see Ecowas as a dysfunctional club of self-interested heads of state that kowtows to Europe.
African public opinion has swung in favour of a brand of populism promising quick military solutions. It’s seen as the antidote to the failure of domestic and multilateral attempts to stem jihadist violence in the Sahel.
In practice, the juntas have relied on states of emergency as a cover for systematic aggression and abuse of civilian populations.
Even if one accepts the trade-off between security and democracy, the new military rulers have so far been unable to stem jihadist violence in their countries. Instead they have committed violence against their own populations. This is especially the case in Mali and Burkina Faso.
These acts include the summary execution of several hundred civilians in Burkina Faso in 2024.
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Despite these abuses, the military juntas have succeeded in framing Ecowas as part of the problem of external control over national sovereignty. This is at the heart of Ecowas’s emerging legitimacy crisis. It is a crisis which undermines many of the soft diplomacy tools that have worked relatively well in the past to unite its members.
The soft power tools include:
the Council of the Wise – deployed in mediation and negotiation in a number of political crises in the region, including those in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Niger, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau and Togo
Offices of the Special Representative and Special Mediators, tasked with conflict mediation and election monitoring
Traditional Authorities and Leaders, who are sent in when other mechanisms fail.
These diplomatic tools are less visible than high-level delegations and official statements or sanctions. But they have been employed in numerous political crises in the subregion over the past two decades.
They have arguably tempered the outcomes of constitutional crises, like the one sparked by a popular uprising in Burkina Faso in 2014. They also defused the political crisis in Guinea Bissau between 2015 and 2019.
The small victories of soft diplomacy don’t always lead to outright successes. But they have been a means to allow Ecowas involvement in mediation efforts. They have ensured the organisation’s overall relevance and justification in the face of unconstitutional changes of government.
The failure of the soft diplomacy mechanisms in the biggest crisis to face Ecowas tests the organisation’s ability to withstand future crises.
The next phase for Ecowas starts in the context of public perceptions critical of the member states. Criticism has been levelled against Ecowas as a “union of heads of state” prioritising their interests over the people’s.
Nevertheless, most of the citizens still prefer democracy as a political system. Even the military juntas embrace (at least on paper) these basic principles as their long-term aspiration.
Ecowas has championed democratic values of equality, freedom, justice, pluralism, tolerance, respect and public participation. These remain the keys to reversing the sub-region’s recent unconstitutional changes of government. Ecowas must strengthen its voice in calling for a return to civilian rule and the respect of its fundamental democratic principles.
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The organisation’s representatives must articulate these basic values as an expression of the will of its citizens.
On the other hand, Ecowas must continue to leave the dorrs openen to the military juntas. This could potentially facilitate the transition to civilian rule and signal a fresh start for regional collaboration. Its soft diplomacy tools will be essential for improving dialogue and reaching viable compromises.
Ecowas must strive to improve its legitimacy in the eyes of the populations of its member states. This can be achieved by applying its own democratic values consistently and objectively across the region. The anniversary provides an important opportunity for introspection and genuine institutional reform.
This article is republished from The Conversation, a nonprofit, independent news organization bringing you facts and trustworthy analysis to help you make sense of our complex world. It was written by: Emmanuel Kwesi Aning, Kofi Annan International Peace Keeping Center and Jesper Bjarnesen, The Nordic Africa Institute
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Emmanuel Kwesi Aning receives funding from D-SIP – Domestic Security Implications of UN Peacekeeping in Ghana, which is a Danish Funded Program
Jesper Bjarnesen receives funding from the Swedish Science Council (grant VR2019-03444). 
