A series of advances by the Sudanese military has led some observers to posit that the African nation’s yearslong civil war could be at a crucial turning point.
Even if it were to end tomorrow, the bloody conflict would have left the Sudanese people scarred by violence that has killed tens of thousands and displaced millions of people. But the recent victories by the military do not spell the end of its adversary, a rebel paramilitary group that still holds large areas in Sudan.
The Conversation turned to Christopher Tounsel, a historian of modern Sudan at the University of Washington, to explain what the war has cost and where it could turn now.
On April 15, 2023, fighting broke out in Sudan between the Sudanese Armed Forces, or SAF – led by de facto head of state Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan – and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces, or RSF, led by Gen. Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known colloquially as “Hemedti.” The RSF emerged out of the feared Janjaweed militia that had terrorized the Darfur region of Sudan.
While the SAF and RSF previously worked together to forcibly remove longtime President Omar al-Bashir from power in 2019, they later split amid a power struggle that turned deadly.
The major point of contention was the disputed timeline for RSF integration into the national military, with the RSF preferring a 10-year process to the SAF’s preferred two-year plan.
By early April 2023, the government deployed SAF troops along the streets of the capital, Khartoum, while RSF forces took up locations throughout the country. Matters came to a head when explosions and gunfire rocked Khartoum on April 15 of that year. The two forces have been in conflict ever since.
To human toll of the civil war has been staggering. As of February 2025, estimates of those killed from the conflict and its related causes, including lack of sufficient medical facilities and hunger, have ranged from 20,000 to 150,000 – a wide gulf that, according to Humanitarian Research Lab executive director Nathaniel Raymond, is partially due to the fact that the dead or displaced are still being counted.
The conflict has displaced more than 14 million people, a number that demographically makes the Sudan situation the world’s worst displacement crisis. Nearly half of Sudan’s population is “acutely food insecure,” according to the U.N.’s World Food Programme. Another 638,000 face “catastrophic levels of hunger” – the world’s highest number.
The SAF has recently scored a slew of victories. At time of writing, the Sudanese military controls much of the country’s southeastern border with Ethiopia, the Red Sea coast – and, with it, Sudan’s strategically important Port Sudan – and parts of the country’s metropolitan center located at the confluence of the Blue and White Nile rivers.
Further, the SAF has reclaimed much of the White Nile and Gezira provinces and broken an RSF siege of North Kordofan’s provincial capital of el-Obeid. In perhaps the most important development, the army in late March recaptured the RSF’s last major stronghold in Khartoum, the Presidential Palace.
Each of these actions indicates that the SAF is taking an increasingly proactive approach in the war. Such positive momentum could not only serve to reassure the Sudanese populace that the SAF is the country’s strongest force but also signal to foreign powers that it is, and will continue to be, the country’s legitimate authority moving forward.
And yet, there are other indications that the RSF is in no rush to concede defeat. Despite the SAF’s advances, the RSF has strengthened its control over nearly all of Darfur, Sudan’s massive western region that shares a lengthy border with neighboring Chad.
It is here that the RSF has been accused of committing genocide against non-Arab communities, and only the besieged capital of North Darfur, El Fasher, stands in the way of total RSF hegemony in the region. The RSF also controls territory to the south, along Sudan’s borders with the Central African Republic and South Sudan.
The fact that the SAF and RSF are entrenched in their respective regional strongholds casts doubt on the significance of the military’s recent victories.
As a historian who spent years writing about South Sudanese separatism, I find it somewhat unfathomable to imagine that Sudan would further splinter into different countries. Given the current state of affairs, however, partition is not outside the realm of possibility. In February, during a summit in Kenya, the RSF and its allies officially commenced plans to create a rival government.
The African Union’s 55 member states are said to be split on the issue of Sudanese partition and the question of whether any entity linked with the RSF should be accepted. In January, during the waning days of U.S. President Joe Biden’s presidency, Washington determined that the RSF and its allies had committed genocide and sanctioned Hemedti, the RSF leader, prohibiting him and his family from traveling to the U.S. and freezing any American assets he may hold.
Any attempt to entertain partition could be read as an acknowledgment of the legitimacy of the RSF and would also create a dangerous precedent for other leaders who have been accused of human rights violations.
In addition to the RSF’s perceived lack of moral legitimacy, there is also the recent precedent of South Sudan’s secession. South Sudan, since seceding from Sudan in 2011, has experienced enormous difficulties. Roughly 2½ years into independence, the nation erupted into a civil war waged largely along ethnic lines. Since the conclusion of that war in 2018, the world’s youngest nation continues to struggle with intergroup violence, food insecurity and sanctions resulting from human rights violations.
Simply put, recent Sudanese history has shown that partition is not a risk-free solution to civil war.
It is important to understand that the conflict’s ripples extend far beyond Sudan’s borders. Similarly, the actions of countries such as the U.S., Russia and China have an impact on the war.
President Donald Trump’s executive order freezing contributions from the U.S. government’s development organization, USAID, has shuttered approximately 80% of the emergency food kitchens established to help those impacted by the conflict. An estimated 2 million people have been affected by this development.
Russian financial and military contributions have been credited with helping the SAF achieve its gains in recent months. Russia has long desired a Red Sea naval base near Port Sudan, and the expulsion of Russia’s fleet from Syria following the fall of President Bashar Assad increased the importance of such a base.
And then there is China. A major importer of Sudanese crude oil, China engaged in conversations to renegotiate oil cooperation agreements with Sudan in October 2024 with the hopes of increasing oil production amid the war. An end to the war – and, with it, protecting the flow of oil through pipelines vulnerable to attack – would benefit both members of this bilateral relationship.
As the war enters its third year, the outlook remains frustratingly difficult to discern.
This article is republished from The Conversation, a nonprofit, independent news organization bringing you facts and trustworthy analysis to help you make sense of our complex world. It was written by: Christopher Tounsel, University of Washington
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Christopher Tounsel has previously received funding from the Council of American Overseas Research Centers. 
