In what’s been called a “Friday night massacre” at the Pentagon, President Donald Trump removed six top generals or admirals on Feb. 21, 2025, including Air Force General C.Q. Brown and Navy Admiral Lisa Franchetti. Trump also fired military lawyers who advise senior officers on the legality of their behavior in combat and at home.
Over at the FBI, the president has tapped loyalists Kash Patel and Dan Bongino to direct the executive branch’s largest internal security agency. These men have little administrative experience in federal law enforcement but have repeated Trump’s lies about the 2020 election.
Trump has reportedly used denialism – about Joe Biden winning the 2020 election and that Jan. 6 entailed pro-Trump protesters violently assaulting police officers – to help vet appointees for senior national security and intelligence posts. Loyalty tests can screen for appointees who will enthusiastically carry out a president’s agenda and follow orders – even if asked to break the law.
Further, Trump promoted Sean Curran, his personal bodyguard, to lead the Secret Service – the presidential guard unit. Curran’s appointment meant bypassing senior service members in favor of what one news report called a “mostly anonymous U.S. Secret Service agent” who had never served in Secret Service headquarters but had a close relationship with Trump.
Such coordinated personnel changes – firing Pentagon lawyers, appointing loyalists to lead the FBI and selecting Trump’s personal bodyguard to lead a security service – are consistent with a strategy of “personalizing” the security forces.
That personalization is a hallmark of strongman rule throughout the world.
Security force personalism happens when leaders reshape the country’s security forces by purging nonpartisan, law-abiding officers and promoting loyal officers who would never rise through the ranks on merit.
Whereas a professional military in a democracy is loyal to the Constitution, personalist security forces are loyal to their leader.
Sometimes this process entails recruiting personnel from the leader’s party or allied ethnic, tribal or extremist groups. It may even include creating a paramilitary force, presidential guard or a new special forces unit staffed with officers and rank-and-file loyal to the leader. These forces then remain outside of the normal military chain of command.
When leaders put loyalists in charge of the men with guns, it becomes easier to repress opposition from citizens, political figures and any dissenting military leaders.
That’s for three reasons.
First, personalized security forces are more likely to follow the leader’s orders to shoot peaceful anti-government protesters. Security forces loyal to Nicaragua’s president, Daniel Ortega, killed roughly 300 protesters in 2018 and 2019 when civil society groups mobilized to protest Ortega’s proposed pension cuts. Loyalist military or paramilitary forces in Russia and Belarus have similarly quashed public dissent in recent years.
Second, because citizens often know that personalized security forces are more likely to shoot citizens than to defend them against foreign threats, opposition groups are less likely to organize a protest. This makes it easier for leaders to silence independent media, jail opposition political candidates, stuff ballot boxes and steal votes so they never lose another election.
A few years after Ortega’s forces killed protesters in the streets, he jailed seven opposition presidential candidates and claimed to have won the 2021 election.
Third, personalism of security forces weakens the power of other groups that might otherwise constrain the leader, such as elites in the ruling political party and even generals who oppose a leader’s power grab.
If elites fear loyal security agents, they tend to keep their mouths shut when they disagree with the leader – or else, research shows, face a purge. Generals, too: Research finds that loyal security forces reduce the risk of military coup attempts.
Our data on security force personalization in autocracies indicates that when leaders put loyalists in charge of security forces, removing these leaders from power peacefully through elections or protest becomes much more difficult.
Take the example of Syria, where President Hafez Assad came to power after a successful military coup in 1971. The country had experienced more than a dozen coup attempts since 1946. The biggest threat to Assad’s power was another military coup.
To minimize this threat, he created a personalized security force by promoting fellow Alawites, a minority ethno-religious group, to the senior ranks of the Syrian military. Assad subsidized military housing for loyal officers and created an overlapping network of family-controlled security units outside the formal military.
Security force personalization harmed the Syrian military’s capacity to fight. This is frequently the case because this process often purges competent officers and creates incentives for senior officers to lie to the leader about bad news.
But it was useful for enabling the Assad family to rob the country blind and ensure that the leader’s son, Bashar Assad, succeeded his father.
Syria did not have free and fair elections under the Assads, and ruling party elites could not check the leader’s power. When citizens mobilized peacefully in 2011 to oust the Assad regime, loyal security forces killed and imprisoned tens of thousands of Syrians.
The Assads’ reign of terror only ended after 12 years of brutal civil war.
Personalized security forces need money – both to ensure loyalty and to acquire the weapons needed when the leader orders violent repression.
So leaders who personalize their security forces must funnel huge sums of money to the most loyal units, sometimes making them more powerful than the regular army.
Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps, for example, receives revenue from state oil exports and controls sanction-busting smuggling networks. Former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein’s Special Guard units, though smaller than the regular military, always had better equipment and training.
In 2003, Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni assigned his son, Muhoozi Kainerugaba, to lead a new Presidential Guard Brigade and gave this unit the job of fighting terrorism so he could control military aid from the U.S. The longtime leader’s son now commands the entire Ugandan Armed Forces. Age 81 and with his son in charge of the men with guns, Museveni looks set to win his eighth term in office next year.
The purges at the Pentagon in late February will not transform the U.S. security apparatus into a personalized force overnight, nor will they likely spur the military to oust Trump. Even though the Constitution establishes civilian control over the military, senior officers can nonetheless resist pressure from Trump to quash protest.
But the firings do spark concerns about politicizing the military. So do other moves by Trump that signal greater ambitions to personalize the security forces, such as selecting loyalists to lead the FBI and Secret Service and purging the military lawyers who help soldiers abide by the law.
Look at the new faces and follow the money. Will the Trump administration bypass the senior ranks to promote junior officers whose military careers depend on Trump remaining in power? Will the US$50 billion “savings” that Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth wants to extract from the Defense Department instead fund a new security force?
The most serious sign of security personalization in the U.S. would be the creation of a new force outside the regular military chain of command – think the Department of Government Efficiency, but with guns. Pro-Trump military contractors are already calling for the government to fund a “small army of private citizens empowered to make arrests” and deport immigrants.
If Trump seeks an unconstitutional third term in 2028, one potential scenario could play out: A loyalist praetorian guard like that would be a threat to kill protesters and fight security units still loyal to the Constitution.
This article is republished from The Conversation, a nonprofit, independent news organization bringing you facts and trustworthy analysis to help you make sense of our complex world. It was written by: Joe Wright, Penn State and John Joseph Chin, Carnegie Mellon University
Read more: Firing civil servants and dismantling government departments is how aspiring strongmen consolidate personal power – lessons from around the globe What’s behind Trump’s flurry of executive action: 4 essential reads on autocrats and authoritarianism Why Trump’s control of the Republican Party is bad for democracy
Joe Wright has received funding from the Charles Koch Foundation.
John Joseph Chin does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
